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INTRODUCTION 
Economic development in knowledgeable circles has a missing dimension— 
the non-economic, which is not quantifiable. Development, a leading sector in 
national transformation, is rooted in nonmaterial factors and requires a positive 
feedback between culture, economy, and polity. I would invite attention to an 
insightful comment from a practising professional economist: ‘The need for 
economic growth in a developing country has few if any economic springs. It arises 
from a desire to assume full status by taking part in an industrial Civilisation, 
participation in which alone enables a nation or individual to compel others to treat it 
as an equal. Inability to take part in it makes a nation militarily powerless against 
neighbours, administratively unable to control its own citizens, and culturally 
incapable of speaking the international language’. 
The functioning of a developmental state has to be viewed in the context of 
regional and international geopolitical environments. First, in the case of Pakistan, 
the troubled relationship with India, a big country assailed by the anxieties and 
complexes of a small and beleaguered nation aspiring to a super-power status with 
hegemonic goals, has cast a lengthening shadow across its path of development. 
Second, our achievement of political independence coincided with the onset and 
intensity of the cold war. In the post-independence period, the stream of national 
freedom merged with the tidal waves of the cold war and became visibly polluted. A 
bipolar world, where the contending superpowers were vying with each other to win 
the allegiance and support of the fledgling states, virtually sucked the latter into the 
geopolitical game as it was being played on the global stage and deflected their 
attention from tackling developmental issues on the home front with a sense of 
urgency. Preoccupation with external dangers narrows the window of opportunity for 
an economic breakthrough in developing countries. Third, the cold war provided us 
with opportunities to tap external sources for balance of payments and project aid 
and to secure supply of arms on concessional basis. In fact, our prolonged and large-
scale dependence on assistance from highly industrialised countries hardened into an 
addiction to it. Instead of progressively phasing out aid, it became virtually a 
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permanent prop of the status quo. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its 
aftermath has saddled us with serious problems of inflow of arms, drugs, refugees, 
and torn asunder the social fabric of a soft state. In the post-cold war era, where 
geoeconomics seems to be replacing geopolitics as a determinant in international 
relations, we have to make a creative adjustment to the emerging realities, and renew 
our commitment to development in an era of diminishing availability of external 
resources. 
 
CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
An unexamined life is not worth living. We have to examine the role of 
culture in development. Culture, for our purposes, is to be defined as the values, 
attitudes and beliefs that shape behaviour and institutions. ‘Of course, culture 
matters. People are ruled by passions, ideologies and their values and even when 
economic interests prevail, they need to be justified by values. The differences 
between nations, especially in the levels of development, are due to education and 
culture’.  A developmental state as against a development resistant state has to 
change traditional mental models and create a climate congenial (a) to dissemination 
of knowledge and skills among the young through education; (b) to selection of 
people for jobs on the basis of competence and merit; (c) to providing opportunities 
to individual or collective enterprise and fostering competition; and (d) to endorsing 
entitlement of people to the fruits of their labour and deferred gratification. 
‘Culture is the mother of institutions’. Napoleon hit the nail on the head when 
he remarked ‘Men are powerless to secure the future, institutions alone fix the 
destinies of nations’.  According to Landes (1988), the political and social 
institutions geared to achieving self-sustaining growth ‘would: 
  • Secure rights of property. 
  • Secure rights of personal liberty.  
  • Enforce rights of contract. 
  • Provide a government of laws rather than men.  
  • Provide responsive government, one that will hear complaint and make 
redress. 
  •  Provide honest government, there should be no rents to favour and 
position.’ 
Sen (1999) comments: ‘Individuals live and operate in a world of 
institutions. Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions 
exist and how they function’.  Fukuyama (1995) has disseminated the view that 
social capital is as important as physical capital and a sine qua non of rational 
economic behaviour. Social capital is defined by him ‘as… set of informal values 
and norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with 
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reliably and honestly, they will come to trust one another. Trust acts like a 
lubricant that makes any group or organisation run more efficiently…. has a large 
and measurable economic value.’  
Power in a society is indissolubly linked with culture. It is the cultural 
dimension that creates the values, norms, symbols and practices for the exercise of 
power. The longing of the public for charismatic leadership in our region is fed by 
myths and historical memories that legitimise the concentration of power in a single 
individual. Charismatic leadership retards the growth of institutions required for 
modernisation and has recourse to symbolic solutions of problems. Charisma is to be 
equated with heroic leadership that rejects economic realities perceived as prosaic. 
Economic reality and myths of effortless quantum leaps occupy very different areas of 
human consciousness. 
 
IDENTITY VERSUS CHANGE 
One of the dilemmas of development is posed by the conflicting pulls of 
identity and development. The compelling question in some influential circles is who 
are we and rarely ‘what are we going to do and how can we can do it’. An insightful 
scholar, surveying the landscape of the Middle East, has analysed this obsession with 
clarity. In times of weakness at home and challenge from abroad in a developing 
country, the issues of identity and authenticity occupy the foreground. The feelings 
of insecurity and vulnerability lead to the pervasive importance of the self, of the 
‘roots and heritage’, and the receding into background of existential and 
developmental issues. What is more, the ‘search for identity is only manifested at a 
static level of reaction and emotion… is a purely theoretical issue concerned mainly 
with displaying ourselves to others in endless, repetitive letters of introduction’. The 
Germans and the Japanese were deeply concerned with issues of authenticity and 
identity; but in their cases identity was viewed in dynamic relationship to national 
advancement requiring reinterpretation and remodelling. Economic development is 
forward looking in its perspectives and aims at building a better future for the people 
through their efforts by creating the incentive of making short-term sacrifices for 
long-term good and by steering them towards adaptive and accommodative 
inclinations in a changing world. We should continue to pay homage to our 
forefathers without defaulting on our obligations to our children and grandchildren.  
In developmental planning, the dilemma between the pull of the past and the push of 
the future is to be resolved by keeping in the forefront the intergenerational 
dimension requiring sacrifices by the present generation for the succeeding ones. 
Such trade offs are of the essence in economic progress. 
 
A HARD OR FIERCE STATE VERSUS A STRONG STATE 
There is a difference between a hard or a fierce state and a strong state: A 
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instruments in penetrating society. The strong state, on the other hand, relying on 
flexibility and persuasiveness, demonstrates capacity to carry out developmental 
tasks through collaboration with centres of power in society rather than exercising 
dominion over them. A distinction between ‘despotic’ power and ‘infrastructural’ 
power goes to the heart of the matter. ‘The fierce state excels in despotic power, the 
strong in infrastructural power.’ The despotic power of a state, released from legal 
restraints, enables it to act in an arbitrary manner and conveys an impression of 
omnipotence. This impression is dispelled before long when cracks are visible in 
translating its commands into reality. It uses symbolism and imagery as aids to ruling 
but seldom seeks legitimacy through performance and good governance. The 
infrastructural power is reflected in the capacity ‘to penetrate society and to organise 
social relations.’ The capacity of a state to collect revenue through direct rather than 
indirect taxation is a reliable indicator of intrinsic strength and acceptance by the 
public of its legitimacy on the basis of performance. To sum up, the pretensions of 
despotism in accelerating development are not to be taken at its face value.  
 
AUTHORITY VERSUS POWER 
The decision-makers and power wielders in developmental states carry a 
mental map that fails to make a distinction between authority and power, a 
distinction that eludes the grasp of the best and brightest in South Asia. Authority 
means the possession of unwritten power and the gravitational influence of 
exemplary conduct on receiving respect and compliance. ‘With authority inevitably 
comes influence but not necessarily power in the sense of capacity to coerce others 
to do what they would not otherwise do’. The differentiation between authority and 
power is of profound significance because it recognises a fundamental reality that a 
state does not have such an inexhaustible reservoir of coercive power as can be 
continually drawn upon for enforcing commands. Coercive power is to be held in 
reserve and used sparingly on infrequent occasions.  A state’s main reliance should 
be on authority to generate consensus on policies through negotiation and on 
participation with a view to clearing the decks for take-off into sustained growth. 
Leadership needs authority derived from performance on the unassailable ground 
that it entails economy in deploying resources to secure voluntary compliance with 
the programmes of a developmental state.  
 
CRISIS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Related to the issues discussed so far is the crisis of implementation, the 
Achilles’ heel of governments in developing countries. It invites the comment: ‘Plus 
ca change plus c’est la meme chose,’ Laws, regulations Z, executive decrees and 
legislative enactments encounter resistance, delays, cost overruns, and even 
derailment at the stage of implementation. The carrying out of decisions embodying 
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manner, sometimes with the intention of negating their effects. The non-delivery of 
public goods to designated beneficiaries and their appropriation by privileged 
intermediaries casts a cloud on the commitment of leadership to meet the basic 
human needs of the people. The delivery mechanism is riddled with holes. Crisis of 
implementation in Pakistan is manifested in the fact that we have non-disbursed and 
unutilised committed aid of the magnitude of around ten billion dollars. 
 
RHETORIC OF REACTION 
Innovative ideas and policies concerning economic development and social 
change invariably encounter reactionary waves swept up by conservative thought. 
Hirschman (1991), author of the Rhetoric of Reaction, has focused on ‘the major 
polemical postures and monoeuvres likely to be engaged by those who set out to 
debunk and overturn progressive policies and movements of ideas’. He comes up 
with three principle reactive-reactionary theses. According to the perversity thesis, 
‘any purposive action only serves to exacerbate the conditions to be remedied. The 
futility thesis holds that attempts at social transformation will be unavailing, that they 
will simply fail to make a dent’.  Finally, the jeopardy thesis maintains that the price 
exacted by positive change or reform will be too high as it undermines some 
previous and cherished accomplishment.  
It is the futility thesis that has been increasingly deployed by some segments 
of our èlites to weaken the drive for development. Obsession with futility of efforts 
and failure complex has been fostered by their incapacity and unwillingness to 
absorb the pain of changing the status quo, and by our ruling class ‘style to make big 
things seem small, exciting things boring, new things familiar’. Given their 
intellectual capacities, economic well-being and predominant influence on the 
climate of opinion, they have to rise equal to the responsibility of a leadership role 
rather than remain ‘apathetic, anomic and alienated. They are a highly privileged 
minority and noblesse oblige summons them to provide deliverance from the 
corrosive effects of failure complex. ‘Such leadership occurs when one or more 
persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one 
another to higher levels of motivation and morality’.  
 
THE ROLE OF ELITES 
The èlites in developing countries, comprising those who have access to 
education, power and wealth, are really part of the problem rather than part of the 
solution. To give a concrete expression, they consist of the politicians, the military, 
landowners, civil servants, businessmen and the intelligentsia. The role of èlites in 
late developing countries, impatient to catch up with the highly industrialised 
countries, is of pivotal importance in modernisation. The great majority of the people 
have to be awakened from their deep slumber and stirred into action to reconstruct 
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conduct and performance; they have to set a high standard of achievement in high 
offices occupied by them; they have to provide an agenda setting forth goals and 
priorities; they have to take upon themselves rather than delegate the all important 
task of organising a functioning as well as a leak-free delivery system. 
For èlites in countries that had experienced foreign subjugation, the challenge 
from the West was met by political and legal systems patterned after the Western 
model. They perceived the gap in relation to the West as essentially constitutional 
and political rather than educational and technological. It is hardly an exaggeration to 
state that the belief was widespread among them, that provided entry into the 
political kingdom was ensured, the gates to other kingdoms would be automatically 
opened to emerging nations. Given the East-West conflict in the cold war which 
lasted almost 50 years, their goals shifted from national self-reliance to foreign 
dependence, from mobilising domestic resources and shaping national consensus to 
negotiating loans and grants from abroad and from grass roots development to 
planning tailored to meet the specifications of aid givers.     
Exploitative, parasitical, and sub-national in outlook, their involvement in 
fomenting ethnic and regional splits in our country is crystal-clear. Obsessed as they 
are with symbols rather than substance, they indulge in the perverse reasoning that 
access to nuclear weapons is an equaliser among nations and a ticket for admission 
to the league of Great Powers. When abroad, they are clamouring for equality among 
nations at international conferences, but back at home, they stifle egalitarian 
impulses and have minimal interest in eradicating poverty.      
The èlites have demonstrated by their conduct that they lack fire in their 
bellies, and have become a constituency for the maintenance of the status quo. The 
ruling groups ‘want highways for their cars, not lanes through muddy settlements; 
they want airports for flights abroad, not bus service to bring squatters to jobs. They 
demand water for houses with plumbing, not for those in shacks. Hospitals and 
schools must be built where the well-off live; clinics and classes in the slums can 
wait’. The growth of the middle class linked to the diversification and modernisation 
of economy with decent paying jobs in the market sector is to be fostered to clip the 
wings of èlites and build a strong coalition for change. The verdict of economic 
history has been that an expanding and flourishing middle class is the backbone of 
sustained growth and democracy.    
 
PRIMACY OF UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION 
One of the questions that continues to haunt me is why in Pakistan we have 
neglected education in our developmental planning, Education, the signature of 
nation-building and the ‘cheap defence of nations’, has been put on the back burner. 
Education is a comprehensive topic comprising primary, secondary, college 
education. My focus in this essay is on the introduction of universal primary 
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realised the indispensable role of universal elementary education in achieving 
equality with the West. Why have the ruling circles, the politicians and planners in 
our land, given lip-service to it but relegated basic education to the bottom rung in 
mapping out priorities and allocating resources?  
We have to attempt a searching analysis of our cosmetic commitment to the 
spread of education in our country. First, we are not an education-conscious society 
compared to the Confucian nations in East Asia. Second, we have to contend with 
the aftermath of the British rule in the subcontinent. ‘The last remaining Englishmen 
are the Indians and Pakistanis’. The British society was èlitist in character; the 
Oxbridge legacy is continuing to cast an ominous shadow across their national 
landscape even in the new millennium. In England, university education was 
accorded top priority and access to equal opportunities for schooling in the formative 
years of childhood was denied. Public schooling, a euphemism for privileged 
learning for the offspring of the èlite, was a crucial factor in fostering class-
consciousness and social resentment in the island nation. We loathed foreign rule but 
our èlites adopted the British educational model. ‘Slaves by their own compulsion. In 
made game they break their manacles, and wear the name of freedom, graven on a 
heavier chain’. Second, feudalism with its boastful credo that the best fertiliser for a 
farmer is the sound of footsteps of a master landowner is the bane of diffusion of 
education. Landowning class is viscerally inimical to the greater awareness and 
consciousness of tillers of the soil through grass roots learning. Third, leaving aside 
the rural areas, feudal values have penetrated all segments of society including the 
urban èlite and the ruling circles. Fourth, we have short-term horizons and are 
reluctant to look upon education as the due from the present to future generation. 
Education is ‘a lead time investment and quick results cannot be expected’. A 
penetrating comment on education as an investment in future merits quotation: ‘If 
you plan for a year, plant a seed. If for ten years, plant a tree. If for a hundred years, 
teach the people. When you teach the people, you will reap a thousand harvests.’ 
Fifth, the focus on ballot box, as the sole route to democracy, has been accompanied 
by a massive devaluation of public education, which is an indispensable condition 
for its successful functioning. We should keep on reminding ourselves that 
‘democracy without literacy is hypocrisy without limitation’.  
We have to understand history in order to make history. We have no 
recorded example in history of a developed country with a large immobilised mass 
of illiterate citizenry. We have incontestable contemporary evidence of late 
developing countries lagging behind in the race for advancement without the lift-
up of a critical mass of educated citizens. The goal of public education lies not in 
the creation of a brilliant elite, but in the generation of a high average level of 
capability. A rising standard of living of a country depends upon an upward 
movement in productivity; the increase in productivity itself hinges on a rise in the 
average level of capability. Najamul Saqib Khan  722
LAND REFORM 
Of the postwar reforms instituted in Japan-the sole Asian nation that has 
caught up with Western countries, the one which had the most far-reaching effects 
was the land reform. The land tenure changes resulted in a major redistribution of 
land affecting seven million farmers and in the transformation of rural society. The 
acid test of a land reform programme is the percentage of the total cultivable area 
released for distribution to the landless. 37.5 percent of the entire cultivable area in 
Japan was transferred to 4.7 million tenants. The owner farmers, who constituted 
about 30 percent of the farming families in 1945, had risen to 65 percent in 1950. 
Tenanted area dropped from 46 percent to 10 percent of the agricultural land. Tenant 
farmers, who owned no land themselves, dropped from 28 percent to 5 percent of all 
farm households. Keeping in view the high level of rents in prewar Japan, rents 
which amounted to 16.6 percent of total agricultural income in 1934-36 dropped to 
about 0.2 percent in 1953.  
The size of land actually redistributed in India and Pakistan after 
independence has not made a significant dent on property relationships in the 
agricultural sector. The numbers of tenants who have become owners of land 
cultivated by them have not been large. Given this grim reality, the security of 
tenancy assumes the proportions of a crucial problem. The measures adopted in 
tenancy legislations in the subcontinent have proved ineffectual in safeguarding the 
rights of tenants: their ejectments continue under the guise of voluntary surrenders 
and informal sharecropping arrangements remain uncontested in substantial regions. 
Myrdal (1968) has commented, ‘In the social environment of South Asia, 
impartiality in the administration of tenancy laws can hardly be expected, even in the 
absence of corruption’. Where it has been possible for the landlord to win the active 
support or acquiescence of the coercive apparatus of the state to lead with impunity a 
parasitic existence and to collect rents, there is clearly little motivation to comply 
with agricultural laws. 
As pointed out by Prosterman and Riedinger (1987), authors of Land Reforms 
and Democratic Development: ‘The acute form of land tenure problem on our planet 
is now highly concentrated. Of the 50-54 million agricultural labourer families in all 
of the non-industrialised countries, between 36.5 and 40 million, or 73-74 percent, 
are found in five Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Of the estimated 33-46 million tenant families, between 28 and 40 
million are in the same five countries’.  According to them, of the 83–100 million 
landless agricultural families in the non-industrialised countries, approximately 78–
80 percent are concentrated in these five countries. They go on to prognosticate on 
the basis of their past experience that a substantial danger of major revolution exists 
for any country 30 percent or more of whose population consisted of landless 
peasants and a critical danger where the percentage rose to 40 percent. In the light of 
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danger of major revolution for any country burdened with a total population 
consisting of 25 percent or more landless peasants. In the light of their definitive 
study of land reform, the five Asian countries including Pakistan, where 25 percent 
or more of the whole population comprises landless agriculturists, face a clear and 
present fact of upheaval if land tenure grievances are not resolved.      
Not only does an inequitable land tenure system lead to large-scale 
landlessness which undermines political stability; it is a major impediment to the 
improvement of agricultural productivity, to the elimination of poverty and in fact to 
the entire development process. ‘The peasant has to be transformed into a farmer 
producing for the market instead of his own consumption and that of the overlord’. 
Land reforms and its effective implementation is to be accorded high priority in a 
redesigned strategy for development in the clear knowledge that it will encounter 
protracted and stiff resistance from the beneficiaries of the status quo. Land reform 
may be looked upon by sceptics as the beating of a distant drum, but it echoes the 
heartbeats of the great majority of our population languishing in the rural areas and 
barely visible on the urban radar screen of our national life. History has yet to 
witness an economic take-off in a sustained manner in late industrialising countries 
without authentic land reforms and universal primary education. 
 
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL AND EMPOWERMENT OF PEOPLE 
In The Mystery of Capital, a pioneering book and an intellectual tour de force, 
its author De Soto (2000) sets out a blueprint targeted at overcoming poverty and 
bringing black markets into the mainstream of developing economies. Its subtitle is 
Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. I will attempt a 
condensed summary of his findings relevant to the themes of this essay. ‘The hour of 
the greatest triumph of capitalism is its hour of crisis’. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
demonstrated that Capitalism alone provides a viable framework for developing and 
running a modern economy. Third world and former communist countries have 
carried out prescriptions of fiscal discipline, phasing out of subsidies, giving 
incentives to foreign investment and progressively reducing trade barriers. When the 
balance sheet is drawn at the beginning of the new millenium, the results flowing 
from the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank have been disappointing: decline in real incomes, swelling of the 
numbers of people living below the poverty line, growing economic anxiety and 
social resentment. In developing countries, capitalism is regarded as creating islands 
of prosperity for a privileged minority surrounded by a sea of human misery. 
Westerners blame third world peoples for their deficits in entrepreneurial spirit and 
market orientation. De Soto challenges this critique by saying that the cities of the 
third world and the former communist countries are teeming with entrepreneurs and 
that their inhabitants, even the poorest, save and acquire assets. In Egypt alone, the 
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including the financing of the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam. By his calculations, 
the total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by the poor of the third 
world and former communists nations is at least 9.3 trillion U.S. dollars. 
The grim reality, according to De Soto, is that the considerable assets of the 
poor remain ‘dead capital’ and at least 80 percent of the population in these countries 
cannot establish legal title to the assets and live outside the legal system. They 
cannot inject life into their assets and make them generate capital because the 
existing laws keep them out of the legal property system. In Egypt, a person wanting 
to acquire and legally register a plot on a state owned desert has to make his way 
through at least 77 bureaucratic procedures at 31 public and private agencies. 
Compliance with procedures will take from 5 to 14 years. To put up a legal dwelling 
on former agricultural land would take six to eleven years of bureaucratic wrangling. 
In Haiti, the poorest nation in Latin America, it takes nineteen years of slow walk 
through the procedural thicket to acquire lawful land. The author, Bubbling with 
Innovative Ideas, says again and again that the challenge is to convert dead assets 
into legal titles. The legal title is required as collateral for borrowing for investment. 
It is a widespread but mistaken view that capital is created by money. The reality is 
that capital is created by people whose ‘property systems helped them to cooperate 
and think how they can get the assets they accumulate to deploy additional 
production’. The substantial increase of capital in the West over the past two 
centuries is rooted in reformed and integrated property systems, which opened new 
opportunities for budding entrepreneurs, cut off from the mainstream, to realise the 
potential of their assets and to utilise them ‘to generate the non-inflationary money 
with which to finance additional production and wealth for the nation’.  
De Soto has persuasively highlighted his belief that the prevailing state of 
affairs in the third world which denies opportunities to the majority of mankind is 
remediable provided the governments have the will to accept the following:  
  • All people save in one form or another and the assets of the poor need to be 
better documented.  
  • What is missing are the legally integrated property systems designed to 
convert their labour and saving into capital.  
  • Civil disobedience and mafias of today are the outcome of exodus from 
rural to urban areas where they face impenetrable barriers denying them 
entry into legally sanctioned economic activities.  
  • Designing and implementing a property system that creates capital is a 
major political challenge involving grass roots contact with people, 
recognition that social contracts underpin enforceable laws and overhauling 
the legal system. 
  •  Empowering the people as the foundation of a thriving economy and society.  
  • Hernando agenda and vocabulary have been slightly amended by me.  Non-economic Factors in Development  725
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the traditional economists have been sceptical about the vital 
links between cultural values and human progress. Federal Reserve Board Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, belonged to the traditional school until the dismal economic failure 
in Russia in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His strong belief was 
that human beings are endowed by nature with capitalistic habits and that their 
release from communism would automatically establish a free market entrepreneurial 
system. The debacle in Russia called for revisiting the assumption that capitalism 
was human nature and Greenspan reached the conclusion ‘that it was not a nature at 
all but culture.’ Culture and its inseparable twin education highlight the importance 
of microeconomics as the foundation of national prosperity. Macroeconomics 
underlines the need of a legal and predictable framework for economic growth; but 
the rise in productivity takes place at the microeconomic level of an individual 
enterprise with its competitive spirit, dynamism and risk taking.  
We cannot violate with impunity the time tested laws of economic progress 
and close our eyes to the unambiguous lessons from the fate of stagnant and non-
performing societies and harbour the illusion that a special immunity from the 
consequences of our entrenched resistance to change has been bestowed on us. We 
should shed the psychology of victimhood, abandon the search for simple panaceas, 
and heed the clarion call to change prevailing attitudes and to build human, social 
and institutional capital at a fast pace.  
 
REFERENCES 
De Soto, Hernando (2000) The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel Huntington (2000) Culture Matters. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Hirschman, Albert (1991) The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Landes, David S. (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich 
and Some are so Poor. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 
Myrdal, Gunnar (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 
Volume II, Pantheon. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 
Prosterman, Roy L., and Jeffrey M. Riedinger (1987) Land Reform and Democratic 
Development. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
The comments on the paper were not received in time for press. Ed. 